- Kosovo marks 20th anniversary of NATO intervention
- To continue reading, subscribe now.
- Read PDF Die Intervention der NATO im Kosovo (German Edition)
Add to cart.
Table of Contents II. Table of Figures 1. Only in did the quadrilateral project become visible, with working bodies, a head office in Warsaw, a staff, conferences, publications, and so on. Today forced migration is one among many topics with which the network is preoccupied.
This kind of community of memory can be established only when all its members will accept the principle of solidarity as [a] basic and common rule for thinking and acting. Application of this principle means [acquainting] oneself with experiences of the others and [respecting] those who see and feel the past differently. As mentioned, the Czech Republic stayed out of all of the projects described above, and even tried to thwart their realization.
Accordingly, the topic is only addressed in local contexts. The new Platform of European Memory and Conscience set up recently in Prague by the European Parliament with the support of the Commission and the Council does not mention forced migration or ethnic cleansing in its program. Any attempt to institutionalize the memory of forced migration in Europe is obviously a difficult and at times frustrating task.
There seem to be too many divergent, even conflicting narratives and perspectives on one and the same forced migration process, not to mention the urge to forget other, similar processes. First, the inner-German discourse on how a national institution devoted to the memory of the victims of expulsion led within a few years to the adoption of a European perspective, even on the side of organizations representing expellees. This may initially have been a tactical move, but by now it would be impossible to retreat behind this line.
Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des The Polish post hoc, ergo propter hoc-argument, according to which the expulsion was the consequence of the German attack of and five years of occupation, terror, mass killings, forced resettlement and enslavement, led in Germany to broader knowledge of German crimes in World War II and put Poland on the map of German culture of remembrance.
Now next to Auschwitz, Treblinka and Majdanek as focal points of the Holocaust and the massacres of Lidice, Oradour, Distomo and Marzabotto, the murder of millions of Poles in annexed and occupied Poland has also become part of collective memory. Parallel, in Poland the perception that rabid and lethal anti-Semitism was not something exclusively German waned in light of publications on the pogroms led by Poles against Jews in Jedwabne in and Kielce in Poles, Jews, Germans, Ukrainians.
Yet even more surprising was the positive reaction by German readers, among them many expellees and even their functionaries, when a German translation of the Polish atlas was published by a Catholic German publishing house in Thirdly, despite all national emotions in Polish-German debates, and occasionally even jingoism, ethnic slander and hate-speech on either side, the mere fact that two national societies in Central Europe engaged in an intense public transnational discussion of one of the most sensitive and painful topics of their recent history is remarkable in itself.
At the same time, this exceptional Central European debate is followed with interest in a number of other European societies, which also have endured experiences of forced migration, including Finland, Italy or Bosnia and Hercegovina, for example. The institutionalization of the memory of forced migrations is still in progress, and the German Federal Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation in Berlin, as well as the quadrilateral European Network Remembrance and Solidarity in Warsaw, no doubt have their organizational flaws and structural weaknesses.
This in and of itself represents a remarkable achievement in a Europe which, in the process of Eastern enlargement, has discovered the need for a common memory as an important element of its identity policy. Also, the current focus on forced migration has the potential to stimulate productive competition with other conflictual realms of memory, such as genocide or colonialism, but also positive ones, like human rights, multiculturalism or the process of European integration. Accessed December 17, Committee of Experts. Brussels, October 19, European Parliament resolution of April 2, on European conscience and totalitarianism.
Brussels, April 2, Accessed December 17, Klich and others. Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe: Establishment of a European remembrance center for victims of forced population movements and ethnic cleansing. Rapporteur Mr. Adelman, Howard and Elazar Barkan. No Return, No Refuge. Rites and Rights in Minority Repatriation. Museums between National and European Identities. In eunamus. Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen. Voraussetzungen, Verlauf, Folgen.
- Manual Die Intervention der NATO im Kosovo (German Edition).
- Subscribe to read | Financial Times!
- How To Start an Online Business in 30 Days.
- Bibliography in: Peace Lost: The Failure of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo!
- Cowboy Rescue [Men for Hire 1] (Siren Publishing Menage Everlasting);
Munich: C. Beck, Buras, Piotr, and Piotr M. Majewski, eds. Erzwungene Wege.
Eine Ausstellung der Stiftung Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen. Potsdam: Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen, Evans, Gareth.
Kosovo marks 20th anniversary of NATO intervention
Erik, and Martin Schulze Wessel, 1— Lead nations and NATO, therefore, increasingly supplemented their military capabilities with contracted resources and expertise. Finally, NATO's role out of area has evolved towards offensive military operations. The lethality of the mission increased markedly from onwards owing to a resurgence of the Taliban and an influx of foreign fighters.
High levels of insecurity and threat persisted until the end of the ISAF mission, necessitating extensive protection for military bases, transport and logistics as well as the local population. Most ISAF contingents, however, did not consider it part of their mandate to provide protective services. PMSCs and their subcontractors were instead made responsible for ensuring their own security.
NATO member states. Since NATO awards and manages contracts in a decentralized manner and through multiple agencies, the available information about the number and size of PMSC contracts in Afghanistan is fragmented and incomplete. If the prospect of accession recedes further into the distance, there is a risk of a "renationalisation" of security and defence policy in these states, resulting in arms stockpiling and instability in the regions concerned.
An invitation to all nine accession candidates would be in line with the Vilnius Statement, adopted on 19 May , in which the nine foreign ministers pledged to work cooperatively for integration into NATO. This option would remove any conflict over the candidates' different levels of progress and strategic priorities.
However, in view of the mixed success of efforts to strengthen operative capacities during the first enlargement round, this approach is unlikely to find much support among NATO members.
To continue reading, subscribe now.
It would therefore be helpful - regardless of which option is selected - if in the Alliance could set a date for the next enlargement round in , or at the latest. This would offer the countries which are not included in the second round a clear framework for their future reform processes. A "mini" round would focus exclusively on Slovenia and Slovakia. Slovenia has not only made substantial progress in the field of political and economic reform; it has also achieved significant advances in its implementation of the MAP objectives since Indeed, Slovenia had the chance of an invitation to commence accession negotiations as early as , but this was opposed by the USA.
The change of government in has removed these impediments and Slovakia has made up a great deal of ground. Slovenia's accession would also send out a political signal to South-East Europe that the region has not been de-coupled from the process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. This option, which is supported by Italy and Hungary, appears to be accepted in the majority of member states. Any other decision is likely to prompt major discussions between those who are in favour of giving priority to enlargement to the south and those who opt for NATO's expansion into North-East Europe.
Politically, both countries - and various others as well - made a major contribution to NATO's success in the Kosovo conflict. Measured against the criteria of internal stability and reform, however, these two countries lag far behind the Baltic states. Giving priority to these two countries cannot be justified in objective terms. It would be apparent that the Baltic states had been passed over solely out of consideration for Russia.
The accession of Romania and Bulgaria is supported by Turkey and Greece. The Baltic states' accession will be a key issue in Prague. In recent years, these states have made significant progress with their democratic and economic reforms as the European Commission's progress reports also show. Their policies towards Russia aim to achieve a balance of interests, an easing of tension, and co-operation. Estonia's and Latvia's efforts to improve the status of their Russian minorities should also be mentioned in this context.
Denmark and numerous supporters in the USA - in the US Congress and outside - are calling for the accession of at least one, but preferably all three Baltic states. The decision on the Baltic states' accession will undoubtedly trigger heated debates, especially due to its impact on relations with Russia.
Russia was vehemently opposed to the first enlargement round. It has now come to terms with the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, probably because the Alliance was prepared to offer security policy concessions.
Russia feels particularly threatened by the accession of states which were once part of the USSR. This, in Russia's view, crosses a "red line". In the current debate, this applies especially to the Baltic states. In its relations with Russia, the Alliance must seek to clarify its policies and engage in confidence-building. NATO must convince its Russian partner that NATO is not interested in "expansion", but that the "open-door" policy reflects the wishes of the accession candidates.
If candidates fulfil the Alliance criteria, NATO cannot deny them entry, for this would call into question the credibility of the "open-door" policy. An effective response must be found to Russia's concerns that it will be excluded from security policy co-operation in Europe. This enhanced co-operation could extend to the offer of a comprehensive treaty on security and co-operation. The Kaliningrad enclave is a particular problem.
Here, Russia's fears of isolation are even more acute than in relation to EU enlargement.
Read PDF Die Intervention der NATO im Kosovo (German Edition)
If the Baltic states are invited to commence accession negotiations, separate talks must be held to identify a solution which takes account of Russia's security interests. But how will the relationship progress until that point? This is a controversial issue. In terms of the Baltic states, it is frequently assumed that EU integration takes priority. The European integration process covers the full spectrum of social and economic issues, and so the EU's criteria for the progress made by accession countries at domestic level are far more stringent than NATO's.
This situation is likely to continue, even if the EU admits its first Central and Eastern European members by As regards Bulgaria and Romania, which will not be included in the first tranche of EU accession states, some people are particularly concerned about the adverse effects of a "dual rejection" and call for their early accession to NATO. This would offer all EU accession candidates a clear security policy perspective and ease the disappointment of states which were not invited to commence accession negotiations.
In transatlantic relations, it is likely to be easier to achieve a consensus on enlargement than on the other two issues. It offers a positive point of reference for the promotion of the Alliance's shared values and security and stability in Europe. There is one discrepancy at present, however. The new US Administration supports enlargement on principle, although - like Canada - it has yet to adopt a firm position on this issue.